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Ajinomoto v. ITC, the Doctrine of Equivalents, and Biomolecule Claim
Limitations at the Federal Circuit
Christopher M. Holman ∗
ABSTRACT
The doctrine of equivalents (DOE) allows a court to hold an accused
infringer liable for patent infringement in spite of the fact that the
accused product (or process) does not fall within the literal scope of
the asserted patent claim(s). Prosecution history estoppel (PHE),
which can be triggered by a narrowing amendment of a patent claim
during patent prosecution, or by arguments made during
prosecution, imposes significant constraints on the ability of a
patentee to assert the DOE. The 1990s and early 2000’s saw a
proliferation of legal commentary postulating that the DOE would
play an important role in protecting inventions arising out of
biotechnology, particularly biomolecules (i.e., proteins and
DNA/polynucleotides), and stressing the need for biotechnology
patentees to avoid amendments or arguments during patent
prosecution that might trigger PHE. In fact, however, prior to 2019
the Federal Circuit does not appear to have issued an opinion finding
infringement under the DOE in a case in which the relevant claim
limitation recites a biomolecule. It finally happened in Ajinomoto
Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, with a divided panel of the Federal
Circuit holding that a claim limitation reciting a DNA sequence,
defined in terms of the amino acid sequence of a protein encoded by
the sequence, was infringed under the DOE by a DNA sequence
encoding a protein having a different (but similar) amino acid
sequence and equivalent function. This article begins with a brief
overview of the DOE and PHE, and explains why DOE was at one
time seen as particularly critical for the enforcement of patent claims
reciting biomolecules. It then summarizes and analyzes the results
of a Westlaw search designed to identify any and all Federal Circuit
decisions applying the DOE and/or PHE to a claim limitation
reciting a biomolecule, including the court’s most recent decision
Ajinomoto.
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The doctrine of equivalents (DOE) allows a court to hold an accused infringer liable for patent
infringement in spite of the fact that the accused product (or process) does not fall within the
literal scope of the asserted patent claim(s). In the United States, the DOE is judge-made law,
rooted in principles of equity and tracing its origins to Supreme Court decisions dating back to
the mid-19th century. The 1990s and early 2000’s saw a dramatic uptick in interest in the DOE,
prompted at least in part by two Supreme Court decisions and an en banc Federal Circuit
decision specifically addressing the DOE, and more particularly prosecution history estoppel
(PHE), a doctrine that imposes significant constraints on the ability of a patentee to assert the
DOE, and which can be triggered by a narrowing amendment of a patent claim during patent
prosecution, or by arguments made during prosecution. 1 This interest in the DOE manifested
itself in a proliferation of law review articles and other legal commentary specifically addressing
the application of the DOE and PHE to biomolecules (i.e., proteins and DNA/polynucleotides)
and other inventions arising out of biotechnology.
A recurring theme in this commentary is an assumption that claim limitations reciting a protein
or polynucleotide are particularly vulnerable to circumvention through the substitution of
molecule having a different amino acid or nucleotide sequence, but that allows for substantially
the same function as the biomolecule recited in the claim. Given this potential vulnerability to
circumvention, the DOE was seen as important means whereby a biotechnology patentee might
be able to achieve an adequate scope of protection for claims reciting a specific biomolecule as a
significant claim limitation. PHE was something to be avoided if at all possible, on the
assumption that the enforceability of biotechnology patent claim would be substantially impaired
if the patentee were limited to the literal scope of the claim, with no opportunity to invoke the
DOE in order to expand the effective scope of the claim to encompass functionally equivalent
variants.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, given the crucial role many commentators attributed to the DOE
in the context of biomolecule claim limitations, prior to 2019 the Federal Circuit does not appear
to have issued an opinion finding infringement under the DOE in a case in which the relevant
claim limitation recites a biomolecule. It finally happened in 2019, however, in the case of
Ajinomoto Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, with a divided panel of the Federal Circuit holding that a
claim limitation reciting a DNA sequence, defined in terms of the amino acid sequence of a
protein encoded by the sequence, was infringed under the DOE by a DNA sequence encoding a
protein having a different (but similar) amino acid sequence and equivalent function. 2
In preparing this article, I performed a Westlaw search designed to identify any and all Federal
Circuit decisions applying the doctrine of equivalents to a claim limitation reciting a
1

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558
(Fed. Cir. 2000) vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
2
Ajinomoto Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 932 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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biomolecule, i.e., either a protein or a polynucleotide. 3 I was somewhat surprised at how few
cases came up that met the criteria, eight in total pre-dating Ajinomoto, including three decisions
in which the Federal Circuit found that the DOE was barred by PHE, and two in which the court
reached a decision of no infringement under the DOE on the merits. I also found three cases in
which a district court found noninfringement under the DOE (twice based on PHE, and once on
the merits), and which on appeal were reversed or vacated by the Federal Circuit, but in which
the Federal Circuit did not decide the issue of infringement under the DOE.
This article begins with a brief overview of the DOE and PHE, and then turns to a discussion as
to why DOE was seen as particularly critical for the enforcement of patent claims reciting
biomolecules. It then summarizes and analyzes the Federal Circuit decisions I found in my
search that apply the DOE and/or PHE to a claim limitation reciting a biomolecule, concluding
with the court’s most recent decision Ajinomoto.

I.

Background on the DOE

The doctrine of equivalents allows a court to hold an accused infringer liable for patent
infringement even though the accused product (or process) does not literally fall within the scope
of the asserted patent claims. It has been described as “a judicial response to the practical reality
that if a patent can be avoided by copying the claimed invention while making a minor,
insubstantial change of just enough scope to take the copied matter outside of the literal
boundaries of the claim, the right to exclude that the patent bestows will not be worth very
much.” 4 In Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co,. the Supreme Court encapsulated
the policy underlying the DOE as “one may not practice a fraud on the patent.” 5
The classic test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is the function-way-result
(FWR), or tripartite test, which looks to whether an asserted equivalent “performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.” 6 Historically, the
Federal Circuit seemed to view the FWR test as the sole test for equivalence under the DOE, but
more recently the Federal Circuit has more often tended to treat the test as merely one way of
determining the fundamental question of whether the differences between the claimed invention
and the accused device are merely “insubstantial”? 7
3

In particular, in December, 2019 I performed the following search of all Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit
decisions in the Westlaw database: ("doctrine of equivalents" & (protein or antibody or DNA or gene or
polynucleotide or nucleic)). The search yielded 109 decisions. I read enough of each decision to determine whether
it met my criterion of applying the DOE and/or PHE to a biomolecule limitation, in a substantive manner. Most of
the 109 decisions did not meet this criterion. All of the decisions that met the criterion are identified and discussed
in this article.
4
Janice Mueller, PATENT LAW, Fifth Ed. (2016, CCH Inc.) at 665.
5
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (195).
6
Id. at 608.
7
Janice Mueller, PATENT LAW, Fifth Ed. (2016, CCH Inc.) at 671, citing Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517-18 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(en banc).
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The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the critical role that the DOE plays in preventing
fraud on patents, has long voiced concern regarding the inherent tension between the DOE and
the important role the literal language of patent claims plays in providing notice to third parties
of the scope of a patentee’s right to exclude. For that reason, the Court has imposed a variety of
judicial constraints on the doctrine. In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., for
example, the Supreme Court held that the DOE is to be applied on a claim limitation-bylimitation basis, rather than to the “invention as a whole.” 8 In other words, a finding of
infringement under the DOE requires that each and every limitation recited in the claim be
present in the accused product (or process), either literally or equivalently.
Perhaps the most notable limitation on the DOE is the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel
(PHE), which limits the ability of a patentee to ensnare under the DOE any subject matter that is
surrendered during prosecution in order to secure allowance of a patent claim. The PHE was the
subject of a Supreme Court decision in 1997, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
in which the Court held that a narrowing amendment of a patent claim made during prosecution
creates a rebuttable presumption that the amendment was made for reasons related to
patentability, which if unrebutted, bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that
element of the claim. The Federal Circuit responded in 2000 with its controversial en banc
decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo I), in which the court
held that no scope of equivalents survive for any claim limitation that was narrowed during
patent prosecution for any reason related to patentability. 9
In 2002, in its landmark Festo II decision, the Supreme Court overturned Festo I, jettisoning its
irrebuttable presumption that a narrowing amendment absolutely forfeited the DOE with respect
to the amended claim limitation, and opting instead for a rebuttable presumption that a narrowing
amendment made for reasons of patentability surrenders the particular equivalent in question. 10
The presumption can be rebutted if the patentee can show that “at the time of the amendment one
skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have
literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.” Festo II identified three ways in which a patentee
might make this showing, and thereby rebut the presumption that an amendment had resulted in
the surrender of a particular equivalent. First, the patentee might show that the equivalent was
“unforeseeable at the time of the application.” Second, “the rationale underlying the amendment
may bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question.” Third, “there may be
some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have
described the insubstantial substitute in question.” These three exceptions to the application of
PHE are often referred to as the “foreseeability,” the “tangential relation,” and the “some other
reason” exceptions.

8

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
10
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
9
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II.

The DOE and Biomolecules

In the 1990s and early 2000’s, a series of law review articles were published that focused
specifically on the appropriate scope and application of the DOE with respect to claim
limitations reciting a protein and polynucleotide. 11 The authors of these articles assumed that the
DOE would play a critical role in the enforcement of patent claims reciting biomolecules. For
example, in a 1991 article the author stated that “[b]iotechnology patent owners whose claims
were drafted before the early 1980s need to assert the doctrine of equivalents because early
claims usually were drafted narrowly.” 12 After Festo II was decided, an article was published
voicing a concern that the decision had saddled patent applicants in the field of biotechnology
with “an undue burden: to specifically claim every possible variant of a nucleotide or amino acid
sequence or risk a finding in court that minor non-functional substitutions in the claimed
sequence were foreseeable,” and thus subject to PHE. 13 The authors of this article, patent
attorneys working in the field of biotechnology, advised applicants prosecuting biotechnology
patents to employee various strategies for avoiding prosecution history estoppel (and thus
maintaining access to the doctrine of equivalents), such as including claims of differing scope
and language in their initial applications in order to minimize the effect of subsequent claim
amendments, avoiding narrowing amendments if possible, and if narrowing amendments are
unavoidable, then filing continuation applications to pursue broader claims later.
The assumption that the DOE would play a critical role in the enforcement of patent claims
reciting biomolecules was grounded in a recognition that certain requirements of a valid patent
claim render it difficult to secure literal patent coverage that is not susceptible to circumvention
by altering the sequence of a claimed amino acid or nucleotide sequence. 14 At the heart of this
susceptibility to circumvention is the inherent redundancy in the relationship between structure
and function in biomolecules. At the polynucleotide level, the redundancy of the genetic code
and the possibility of silent codon substitutions allow for an astronomical number of different
11

See, e.g., Gregory B. Sephton, Biotechnology: The Doctrine of Equivalents and Infringement of Patented
Proteins, 25 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1035 (1991); Michael T. Siekman, The Expanded Hypothetical Claim Test: A
Better Test for Infringement for Biotechnology Patents under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 2 B. U. J. Sci. & Tech. L.
52 (1996); Lawrence S. Graham, Equitable Equivalents: Biotechnology and the Doctrine of Equivalents after
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 6 J.L. & Pol'y 741 (1998); Qing Lin, A Proposed Test for
Applying the Doctrine of Equivalents to Biotechnology Inventions: the Nonobviousness Test, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 885
(1999); Edward R. Jr. Ergenzinger & W. Murry Spruill, The Doctrine of Equivalents after Festo: A Disparate
Impact on Biotechnological Inventions, 2003 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2 (2003); J. Jason Lang, The German Resolution:
A Proposed Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis and a Flexible Rule of Prosecution History Estoppel for
Biotechnology, 52 Emory L.J. 427 (2003).
12
Gregory B. Sephton, Biotechnology: The Doctrine of Equivalents and Infringement of Patented Proteins, 25
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1035 (1991).
13
Edward R. Jr. Ergenzinger & W. Murry Spruill, The Doctrine of Equivalents after Festo: A Disparate Impact on
Biotechnological Inventions, 2003 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2 (2003).
14
For a general discussion of the issue, see Christopher M. Holman, Protein Similarity Score: A Simplified Version
of the BLAST Score as a Superior Alternative to Percent Identity for Claiming Genuses of Related Protein
Sequences, 21 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech.. L.J. 55 (2004).
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DNA sequences that encode for the same amino acid sequence. At the protein level, relatively
large changes in the amino acid sequence, in the form of amino acid substitutions, deletions, or
insertions, can be introduced into a protein without substantially altering its function. A patent
claim limited to a single amino acid sequence or gene sequence can be extremely easy to
circumvent by making minor changes to the sequence that do not substantially alter the
molecule’s function. The scope of patent claims can be expanded by drafting claims that
encompass these variations, but the enablement and written description doctrines constrain the
ability of biotechnology patent applicants to broadly claim genuses of related biomolecules. As
a consequence, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to secure a valid patent claim that recites a
biomolecule in sufficiently broad terms to literally preclude relatively facile circumvention by
use of a sequence variant that retains the function of the claimed biomolecule.

III.

Federal Circuit Decisions Addressing DOE and Biomolecule Claim
Limitations

My Westlaw search, described above, identified a total of eight pre-Ajinomoto Federal Circuit
decisions, dating back to as early as 1990, that addressed the DOE in the context of a claim
limitation reciting a biomolecule. In three of these decisions the court held that PHE applied,
and barred the patentee from asserting infringement under the DOE. In two other decisions, a
district court held that PHE applied, but the Federal Circuit disagreed, in one case vacating the
finding of PHE and remanding for the district court to reconsider the issue, and in the other
reversing the district court. In two decisions, the court addressed the merits of an allegation of
infringement under the DOE, in both cases finding no infringement under the doctrine. And in
one decision, a district court found no infringement under the DOE on the merits on a motion for
summary judgment, and the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that factual issues precluded
summary adjudication. These eight decisions are summarized below, followed by a summary of
Anjinomoto, the most recent decision of the Federal Circuit addressing DOE in the context of a
biomolecule, and the only one in which an accused infringer was found liable for infringement
under the doctrine.

A. Decisions Holding That PHE Applies
In the following three decisions the Federal Circuit invoked the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel to bar a finding of equivalents with respect to a biomolecule claim limitation.
1. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co
The earliest of the three decisions, decided in 1997, was Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli
Lilly & Co.. 15 The claims at issue recited genetic constructs (i.e., synthetic DNA molecules)
capable of directly expressing human pre-insulin (PI). The Federal Circuit held that the patent
owner was estopped from arguing that expression of human PI via a fusion protein intermediate
15

Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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is equivalent to direct expression of human PI, based on amendments to the claims made during
prosecution to overcome prior art-based rejections.
In particular, as originally filed some of the claims recited a DNA transfer vector “comprising” a
DNA sequence coding for human PI. The claims were rejected as anticipated by prior art
teaching the use of recombinant eukaryotic/prokaryotic fusion proteins for the production of a
eukaryotic protein, including insulin, in a recombinant bacterium. The patent applicant amended
the claims, replacing the word “comprising” with the narrower term “consisting essentially of.”
The examiner allowed the amended claims, noting that the “consisting essentially of” language
“excludes from the [DNA sequence] the presence of sequences other than [those coding for PI].”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that this amendment estopped the patent the
from arguing that the claim encompassed fusion proteins under the doctrine of equivalents. Note
that this case was decided shortly after Warner-Jenkinson, and prior to the en banc Federal
Circuit’s Festo I decision.
2. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co.
The next decision in which the Federal Circuit found a patent owner estopped from asserting the
doctrine of equivalents with respect to a biomolecule limitation was Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v.
Monsanto Co.. 16 This case was decided in 2004, shortly after Supreme Court set forth the
current standard for assessing PHE in Festo II. The patent at issue teaches how to modify a gene
that encodes a pesticidal protein of the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (“Bt”) for improved
expression in plants, allowing for the production of the protein at a sufficiently high levels to kill
insects. Modifications taught by the patent include altering the codons in the native Bt gene to
contain a greater number of codons preferred by the intended plant host than the native bacterial
gene prior to modification, while still expressing the same amino acid sequence of the Bt protein.
Figure 1 of the patent discloses the DNA sequence of a specific synthetic codon-modified Bt
gene engineered for improved expression in a plant host. The claims at issue in the case recite a
synthetic gene “comprising the DNA sequence presented in FIG. 1,” i.e., the specific codonmodified Bt gene disclosed in the patent.
The DNA sequences of Monsanto’s accused genes were significantly different than the sequence
presented in FIG. 1 of the patent, clearly precluding a finding of literal infringement, as decided
by the district court on a motion for summary judgment and affirmed by the Federal Circuit. But
Monsanto’s genes were synthetic codon-modified Bt genes modified to contain a greater number
of plant-preferred codons, as taught by the patent specification. In particular, the accused genes
were about 78% homologous to the native Bt gene on which they were based, and employed
plant-preferred codons at a frequency of about 51 percent. The patent owner, Mycogen, argued
that Monsanto’s modified Bt genes infringed under the doctrine of equivalents, but the district

16

Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 91 F. App'x 666 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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court held that PHE barred Mycogen’s assertion of infringement under the DOE, and on appeal
the Federal Circuit affirmed.
During prosecution, the patent application that ultimately issued as Mycogen’s patent included
the following claims broadly reciting structural variants of a Bt gene designed for improved
expression in plants:
1. A synthetic gene designed to be highly expressed in plants comprising a
DNA sequence encoding an insecticidal protein which is functionally
equivalent to a native insecticidal protein of Bt.
2. A synthetic gene of claim 1 wherein said DNA sequence is at least about
85% homologous to a native insecticidal protein gene of Bt.
5. A synthetic gene of claim 1 wherein the overall frequency of preferred
codon usage within the entire coding region of said synthetic gene is within
about 75% of the frequency of codon usage preferred in plants.
6. A synthetic gene of claim 1 wherein the frequency of preferred codon
usage within the entire coding region of said synthetic gene is within about
90% of the frequency of codon usage preferred in plants.
Mycogen canceled all of these claims after they were rejected for lack of enablement, with the
examiner asserting that “the disclosure is enabling only for claims limited to claims which recite
the sequence shown in Figure 1[sic].” In assessing the scope of PHE, the Federal Circuit found
it significant that these canceled claims were broader than the claims asserted by Mycogen
against Monsanto, but yet still not broad enough to encompass the accused Monsanto genes.
Applying Festo II, the Federal Circuit found it immaterial that the claims at issue were not
themselves amended to avoid patentability rejections, because broader claims which addressed
the same claim limitations at issue in this case, i.e., gene homology and preferred codon usage,
had been canceled in response to a rejection for unpatentability, namely a failure to enable
anything other than the recited sequence in Figure 1. The cancellation of the broader claims
created a rebuttable presumption that all subject matter between the pertinent limitations of the
original claims and those of the final, issued claims was surrendered.
Invoking Festo’s foreseeability exception, Mycogen argued that it should be permitted to present
extrinsic evidence that the accused equivalent in this case, namely a gene with approximately 78
percent homology with the native Bt gene, and having a plant-preferred codon usage of 51
percent, was unforeseeable at the time of patenting. However, the Federal Circuit held that the
fact that Mycogen originally claimed coverage of genes bearing 85 percent similarity to the
native Bt gene provides evidence that the applicants foresaw the possibility of less homologous
genes. Moreover, Mycogen originally attempted to claim all functionally equivalent genes in
original independent claim 1. Mycogen clearly tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain coverage of the
8
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least homologous genes that it could claim, but was repeatedly unable to satisfy the rejections of
the examiner for anything broader than the specific gene listed in Figure 1. Thus, broader
coverage was clearly foreseeable, yet unattainable in light of the patent's limited disclosure.
Turning to Festo’s tangential exception, Mycogen argued that the reason for the cancellation of
claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 was merely tangential to achieving a patentable invention because Mycogen
successfully obtained broader product-by-process claims in different patents, which were held to
be infringed by Monsanto's product. The court rejected this argument, finding “no legal support
for the proposition that obtaining broader claims of a different nature has the effect of
broadening the range of equivalence available to all claims, including product claims, when
those product claims have been effectively narrowed by claim cancellation.”
In short, Mycogen was estopped from asserting the DOE against Monsanto because the company
had narrowed the scope of its claim coverage vis-à-vis the nucleotide homology and the
frequency of plant-preferred codon usage.
3. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.
In Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., decided in 2006, the relevant claims at issue
were product claims 2-4 of U.S. Patent No. 5,621,080 (“the '080 patent”), directed towards
glycosylated erythropoietin (EPO). 17 These claims all included the limitation that the
“erythropoietin glycoprotein comprises the mature erythropoietin amino acid sequence of FIG.
6.” Figure 6 of the patent discloses a DNA sequence coding for a protein consisting of 166 amino
acids, which is the form of the native human protein as it is initially synthesized in a human cell.
Mature human EPO, on the other hand, actually contains only 165 amino acids, because the
166th amino acid, arginine, is cleaved off prior to secretion of the protein from the cell. The
question before the court was whether prosecution history estoppel barred Amgen from claiming
that the asserted claims encompasses HMR's accused EPO product, which was mature and thus
only consisting of 165 amino acids, under the doctrine of equivalents.
The prosecution history of Amgen’s claims is quite complex, but essentially the court found that
as initially filed the patent application claimed proteins having the sequence of both human and
non-human monkey EPO, as well as “a fragment” of the human EPO. The court further found
that, in order to overcome a double-patenting rejection, which the court found to be related to
patentability under Festo II, the applicant had amended the claim to recite only a human EPO
product having the complete amino acid sequence of Figure 6, i.e., the 166 amino acid sequence,
creating a presumption of estoppel with respect to HMR’s accused 165 amino acid sequence.
The district court determined that Amgen had failed to show that a 165 amino acid form of EPO
was unforeseeable at the time of the amendment, and thus Festo’s unforeseeability exception did
not apply. However, the district court went on to find that Amgen had succeeded in rebutting the
presumption of PHE through the tangential exception, because the amendment was only intended
17

Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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to limit the claims to human EPO products, not to limit the number of amino acids, and that there
was no more than a tangential relationship between the amendment and the equivalence of a 165
amino acid EPO.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to the unforeseeability exception, agreeing
that the 165 amino acid version of EPO was a foreseeable equivalent because the patentee
admittedly knew about the 165 amino acid equivalent at the time of the narrowing amendment.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court, however, with respect to the tangential
exception, and held that Amgen had not only amended the claims to limit them to human EPO
products, but had also narrowed the claim so as to not cover fragments of the 166 amino acid
EPO sequence disclosed in Figure 6. The Federal Circuit found that narrowing the claim to
exclude fragments of the 166 amino acid EPO “may have been central” to overcoming the
double-patenting rejection, and not merely tangential to the question of whether the 165 amino
acid accused product infringed, since removal of the arginine essentially created a fragment of
the full-length amino acid sequence. The court further found that if the patentee had wished only
to limit the claims to human EPO, without disclaiming fragments, the patentee could have done
so by continuing to use the adjective “human” when referring to EPO in the amended claims, but
instead chose to further narrow the claims by making reference to the specific sequence in Figure
6.
The district court had also set forth an alternate rationale under Festo’s “some other reason”
exception for finding that Amgen had overcome the presumption of PHE, based on the fact that,
before the amendment was introduced, Amgen disclosed information to the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) concerning the fact that mature human EPO consists of only165 amino
acids. The district court also relied on extrinsic evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would understand that Amgen meant to claim human EPO having either 165 or 166 amino acids
at the time of the amendment. The court reasoned that Amgen had rebutted the Festo
presumption under the “some other reason” criterion because the patentee could not have
reasonably been expected to have described the 165 amino acid equivalent, because those of skill
in the art would have interpreted the amendment to cover the 165 amino acid equivalent.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, finding that the district court's analysis had not correctly
applied the Supreme Court's explanation of the “some other reason” rebuttal argument, pursuant
to which the “other reason” must be of such a nature that the patentee could “not reasonably be
expected” to write a claim to encompass the equivalent, such as a shortcoming of language. The
court found that Amgen knew of the 165 amino acid sequence at the time of the amendment, but
chose to limit the claims to the 166 amino acid sequence depicted in Figure 6, and that whether
the patentee, the examiner, or a person of skill in the art may have thought the claims
encompassed EPO with 165 amino acids does not excuse Amgen's failure to claim the
equivalent. Further, there were no shortcomings of language that might have prevented Amgen
from claiming EPO having 165 amino acids. The patentee could have simply claimed mature
10
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human EPO without reference to Figure 6. Alternatively, the patentee could have claimed EPO
having the amino acid sequence disclosed in Figure 6 or a “fragment thereof.” In short, there was
no linguistic barrier to claiming EPO comprised of 165 amino acids.
Having failed to qualify for any of the Festo exceptions, Amgen was held to be barred by PHE
from asserting equivalents with respect to the accused 165 amino acid form of EPO.

B. Decisions Overturning a District Court’s Finding of PHE
In the following two decisions a district court invoked the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel to bar a finding of infringement under the DOE with respect to a biomolecule claim
limitation, but on appeal the Federal Circuit vacated or reversed the district court’s decision.
1. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
The earliest Federal Circuit decision I could find addressing PHE or DOE in the context of a
biomolecule limitation was Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., decided in
1990. 18 The relevant claim limitation recites a product having “a structure corresponding to FIG.
2” of the patent. Figure 2 discloses the amino acid sequence of a synthetic version of human
growth hormone (hGH) that was synthesized by the patent applicant, and which at the time was
thought to be sequence of naturally occurring hGH. Later, it was found that the amino acid
sequence of natural hGH is slightly different than that set forth in Figure 2. The district court
found that the accused product, a recombinantly produced hGH having the same sequence as
native hGH, did not literally infringe, because the literal scope of the asserted claims was limited
to a material having the “exact structure and conformation” shown in Figure 2, i.e., the amino
acid sequence of the synthetic hGH. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to the
finding of no literal infringement.
The district court also found that PHE precluded the patent owner from asserting the DOE, but
the Federal Circuit reversed on this issue and remanded for reconsideration. The district court’s
finding of PHE was not based on any amendment of the claims, but rather on arguments made by
the patent applicant to overcome a prior art reference. In particular, in the course of arguing that
prior art identified by the examiner did not anticipate the claims, the applicant stated that the
claims are “limited to the structures shown in the drawings and are not directed broadly to hGH
or its derivatives, and that “these product claims are specific to the chemical formula of Fig. 2 or
Fig. 3, and the reference does not show the same.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district court interpreted these statements to mean
that the pending claims were confined to the specific structure of Figure 2 and that the prior art
reference was not anticipatory because it depicted the different, although very close, structure of
natural hGH. The Federal Circuit found that, if it were clear that this was the message that the
applicant’s arguments were intended to convey, the district court's determination that the
18

Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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prosecution history precludes the patentee from recovering under the doctrine of equivalents
would be correct.
But the Federal Circuit found that there were other plausible interpretations of the statements
made by the applicant in arguing that the claims were not anticipated by the prior art, and that
these alternate interpretations would not necessarily lead to a conclusion of prosecution history
estoppel. For example, the applicant might have only intended to surrender molecules derived
from natural HGH, or might have intended to suggest that the prior art was not anticipatory of
the rejected claims because it was not enabling under 35 U.S.C. § 112, since it did not disclose a
structure of, or how to make, hGH. The Federal Circuit held that the existence of disputed
factual questions regarding the intent and meaning of the prosecution arguments precluded
summary judgment, and vacated the district court’s finding of prosecution history estoppel.
2. Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd.
In Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., the claim at issue recites a “vector comprising an isolated DNA
molecule comprising a sequence selected from the group consisting of ORFs [open reading
frames] 1 to 13 of porcine circovirus type II [PCV-2].” 19 The invention was based on the
discovery of a new type of pathogenic viruses, which was dubbed PCV-2, to distinguish it from a
previously identified and related, but non-pathogenic, type of PCV referred to as type I, or PCV1. The patent discloses PK/15, a DNA sequence previously identified and isolated from pig
kidney cells, as a representative example of a PCV-1 virus. The patent further discloses five
isolated pathogenic porcine circovirus strains that are identified as representative of type II, i.e.,
PCV-2. In particular, the patent specification provides DNA sequences for the genomes of four
PCV-2 strains, and observes that the sequenced PCV-2 strains exhibit 96% nucleotide homology
with each other, and only 76% nucleotide homology with PK/15, the representative PCV-1
strain. 20 The specification also identified thirteen ORFs in the PCV-2 genomes, nine of which
are unique to PCV–2, and four that are present in both PCV–2 and PCV–1. 21
The allegedly infringing vaccine, produced by Intervet, contained a nucleotide sequence that was
99.7% homologous to one of the PCV-2 sequences disclosed in the specification. The district
court held that there was no literal infringement because the sequence was not identical to any of
the PCV-2 sequences provided in the patent. The district court further found that PHE prevented
the patent owner from asserting infringement under the DOE. On appeal, the Federal Circuit
held that the district court had erred in finding that PHE precluded Merial from arguing that the
accused product was equivalent to one of the ORFs recited in the claim, and instructed the
district court on remand to consider whether the claim was infringed under the DOE.
As originally drafted, the claim recited a “vector comprising an isolated DNA molecule
comprising a sequence selected from the group consisting of ORFs 1–13.” The examiner rejected
19

Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
The court uses the term homology, but defines it to mean identity.
21
An ORF is a portion of a gene that contains a sequence of nucleotide bases that may be translated into a protein.
20
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this claim in view of ORFs from PK/15, noting that for purposes of the rejection “[t]he ORFs are
assumed to be derived from porcine circovirus, but as written, the claims could encompass ORFs
from any organism.” The applicant amended the claim to add the limitation that the recited ORFs
were “of porcine circovirus type II,” at which point the claim was allowed.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the amendment was
substantially related to patentability, thus raising a presumption of surrender for all equivalents
residing in the territory between the identified ORFs of PCV–2 and ORFs of PCV–1, as well as
corresponding ORFs, if any, for any non-porcine organism. Merial was thus estopped from
arguing that ORFs of pathogenic circoviruses found in other organisms are equivalent to ORFs
of PCV–2. It was also estopped from arguing that ORFs of a pathogenic strain of PCV–1 having
strong homology with PK/15 and weak homology with the representative PCV-2 strains
disclosed in the patent are equivalent to ORFs of PCV–2. Merial was not, however, estopped
from arguing that a pathogenic porcine viral sequence with over 99% nucleotide homology with
one of the five representative strains is equivalent to that strain. The Federal Circuit found that,
under Festo II, “such a draconian preclusion would be beyond a fair interpretation of what was
surrendered.” In the view of the Federal Circuit, the rationale underlying the amendment was to
narrow the claimed universe of ORFs down to those of PCV–2, and bore only a tangential
relation to the question of which DNA sequences are, and which sequences are not, properly
characterized as PCV–2.

C. Decisions Finding No Infringement under the DOE
In the following two decisions the Federal Circuit addressed the merits of an assertion of
infringement under the DOE, with respect to a biomolecule claim limitation, and held that there
was no infringement.
1. Genentech v. Wellcome
The first Federal Circuit decision to meet these criteria was Genentech v.Wellcome, one of the
seminal decisions of biotechnology patent law. 22 There were three patent claims at issue in the
case, all relating to human tissue plasminogen activator (human t-PA), referred to herein as the
“protein claim,” the “cell culture claim,” and the “process claim.”
The “protein claim” recites “human plasminogen activator, having thrombolytic properties,
immunologically distinct from urokinase and having a specific activity of about 500,000 IU/mg.
using the WHO First International Reference Preparation of t–PA (tissue plasminogen activator)
as assay standard or a specific activity of about 90,000 IU/mg. using the WHO First International
Reference Preparation of urokinase as assay standard.” 23
The “cell culture claim” recites a “cell culture capable of expressing human tissue plasminogen
activator, obtained by transforming a mammalian cell line with a…recombinant expression
22
23

Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
US Patent 4,752,603, claim 1.
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vector containing a DNA sequence encoding human tissue plasminogen activator, wherein the
vector is capable of expressing human tissue plasminogen activator in a transformed
microorganism or cell culture.” 24
The “process claim” recites a “process for producing recombinant human tissue plasminogen
activator comprising: (a) growing recombinant cells in a growth medium, said cells being a
microorganism or cell culture transformed with an expression vector containing DNA encoding
human tissue plasminogen activator; and (b) simultaneously expressing said DNA, thereby
producing recombinant human tissue plasminogen activator.” 25
The accused product at issue in the case was identified as FE1X, a recombinant versions of
human tPA that was structurally distinct from natural t-PA in ways intended to render it superior
as a human therapeutic (used to treat heart attack). The amino acid sequence of natural t-PA
consists of five separate domains, each having different functional attributes: the Finger (F)
region, the Epidermal Growth (E) region, the Kringle 1 (K1) region, the Kringle 2 (K2) region,
and the Serine Protease (P) region. The FE1X protein takes its name from the fact that it lacks
the Finger (F) region and most of the Epidermal Growth (E) region of natural t-PA, and
eliminates one of the carbohydrate chains by altering the protein at position 117 of the K1 region
(where glutamine is substituted for arginine), thereby changing the glycosylation pattern (1X). It
also has a different amino acid at position 245.
On a motion for summary judgment, the district court found that FE1X did not literally infringe
the protein claim, and that the processes and reagents used to produce recombinant FE1X did not
infringe the cell culture or process claims. All three of the claims included the term “human
plasminogen activator” or “human tissue plasminogen activator,” which the court interpreted as
limited to the genus consisting of the full-length amino acid sequence of human t-PA and any
“naturally-occurring allelic variant” thereof. FE1X does not literally fall within this definition.
However, the jury found that FE1X infringed all three of the claims under the DOE, and the trial
court denied the accused infringer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of
noninfringement.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the trial judge should have granted JMOL in
favor of the accused infringer on the DOE finding by the jury. The DOE analysis focused on
two limitations appearing in the claims: (1) the “specific activity limitation” recited in the protein
claim, which limited the claim to a tissue plasminogen activator “having a specific activity of
about 500,000 IU/mg”; and (2) the “human tissue plasminogen activator limitation,” which
limited the cell culture and process claims to recombinant cells “containing a DNA sequence
encoding human tissue plasminogen activator and thereby “capable of expressing human tissue
plasminogen activator.”
24
25

US Patent 4,766,075, claim 8.
US Patent 4,853,330 claim 8.
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The court’s analysis of the human t-PA relied solely on the function-way-result test, which the
court held required a showing of substantial identity of function, way, and result in order to
support a finding of equivalency. At the outset of its analysis, the court explicitly recognized
that there are a variety of ways to define the function of a protein, some quite broad and others
relatively narrow, and that the outcome of the analysis will hinge upon how function is defined.
In denying JMOL, the trial court had assumed a broad definition of the function of human t-PA,
which is to stimulate “the dissolution of fibrin clots through the cleavage of plasminogen to
plasmin.” But the Federal Circuit took issue with this definition, finding it “difficult to imagine
how FE1X, or any version of t-PA for that matter, would avoid infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents because t-PA, or any operative variant, would by definition necessarily perform
this function in the same general way with the same general results.”
Instead, the Federal Circuit opted for a narrower definition of function, which requires a t-PA to
not only catalyze the conversion of plasminogen to plasmin, but also to bind to fibrin. The court
pointed to Graver Tank for the proposition that the “operative definition for purposes of
equivalency analysis is the intended function as seen in the context of the patent, the prosecution
history, and the prior art.” According to the court, this with the definition of t-PA as set forth in
the specification, with the specification expressly defining fibrin binding as a critical component
of the “function” of human t-PA. The court found this interpretation to be supported by not only
the specification, but also extrinsic evidence, including a British patent application filed by one
of the accused infringers, which identified fibrin binding as a therapeutically critical function of
human t-PA, because it reduces the risk of hemorrhaging. Moreover, two of the inventors
testified that the fibrin binding affinity of human t-PA is a critical distinction between this
protein and the two plasminogen activators, urokinase and streptokinase, that were known to the
prior art. The court pointed out that a functional definition of t-PA that did not include fibrin
binding would result in a range of equivalents that impermissibly encompassed these prior art
proteins. In short, the court found that the “function” of human t-PA for the purposes of
equivalency analysis includes fibrin binding, and no reasonable jury could have concluded
otherwise.
Turning to the “way” and “result” prongs of the tripartite test, the court found the record to be
devoid of any particularized evidence or linking argument showing that FE1X functions in
substantially the same way as human t-PA or achieves substantially the same results. Although
the patent owner pointed to testimony of several witnesses to the effect that the Kringle 2 (K2)
region of amino acids is present in both FE1X and human t-PA, and that this region plays a role
in the ability both to bind fibrin, the court found this testimony to be “speculative … tentative
and conclusory.”
The court went on to find that, even if one were to assume that the K2 region retained in FE1X
play some role in the binding of fibrin, this would hardly establish that the native t-PA and FE1X
“bind to fibrin is substantially the same way with substantially the same results, particularly in
15
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view of the overwhelming and undisputed evidence that the two possess dramatically different
properties and structure.” First, there was undisputed testimony that the fibrin binding affinity of
FE1X is less than half that of human t-PA. Second, there was undisputed evidence showing that
an amino acid substitution in FE1X would eliminate a glycosylation site, substantially altering
the mode of binding. And third, there was undisputed evidence that FE1X behaved significantly
different than human t-PA in the human body. In particular, FE1X has a half-life about 10x that
of natural t-PA, and has a significantly decreased affinity for binding to endothelial cells in
relation to human t-PA. In short, the alterations that rendered FE1X a better therapeutic
molecule than its natural counterpart also rendered the molecule substantially different for
purposes of equivalence under the DOE.
In closing, the Federal Circuit noted:
We are mindful that the state of the science in this area of endeavor is very
imprecise. Thus, it would be inappropriate to [require] plaintiffs/appellees
to prove the specific mechanism by which FE1X binds to fibrin, or to prove
that the different properties and structure exhibited by FE1X bear no
relation to the binding function. Our only point is that the showing that the
K2 region plays a role in the binding function of each is insufficient,
particularly in view of the profound differences in the properties and
structure possessed by each. 26
Having thus found the cell culture and process claims not infringed under the DOE, the court
turned its attention to the remaining protein claim. Although this claim recited “human
plasminogen activator,” the court found it unnecessary to reach a conclusion as to whether FE1X
is equivalent to human plasminogen activator, instead basing its finding of noninfringement
under the DOE on its analysis of the “specific activity” limitation. Specific activity is a measure
of protein purity, based on the amount of protein activity per milligram of protein in a sample.
The protein claim did not originally include the specific activity limitation, but it was added
during prosecution in order to distinguish the claim over prior art. In particular, prior art
attributable to one of the named inventors disclosed purified human t-PA having a specific
activity of 266,000 IU/mg, and a rejection based on this prior art was overcome by adding a
limitation of a specific activity of “about 500,000 IU/mg.” The court found that the only
evidence in the record regarding the specific activity of FE1X showed that the specific activity of
FE1X to be approximately 253,800 IU/mg, i.e., essentially the same as the prior art, and that no
reasonable jury could have concluded that the patent owner was not estopped from arguing that a
plasminogen activator with roughly the same activity as the prior art, which was avoided by the
amendment to the claim, infringes under the DOE.

26

29 F.3d at 1569.
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Judge Lourie, the Federal Circuit judge who took the leading role in the Federal Circuit’s early
biotech jurisprudence, joined the majority’s opinion, but filed a concurrence arguing for a
different framework for analyzing a DNA or protein for equivalence under the DOE. 27 He
argued that, under Graver Tank, an accused compound can be found to infringe if it represents
only an insubstantial change from the claimed compound. In his view, the difference between
FE1X and native tPA is substantial given that FE1X has 15% fewer amino acid, i.e, 446 v. 527,
and ten times the half-life of natural t-PA. He further found that FE1X was not the product of
copying, but rather a very different material, “independently invented and developed, requiring
an estimated 130 man-years, and costing $20 million. If claims are to have any meaning, as a
matter of law such a substance cannot be held to be infringing.”
He concluded his concurrence with the following observation:
[T]his case illustrates the problem that results … when the fact-finder
unduly focuses only on the function, way, result analysis of Graver Tank.
These limited means of analysis fail to fully elucidate the issue, especially
when the patented material is a chemical, as it is here. Is the increased halflife part of the “way” analysis or is it a different “result”? Is the binding to
fibrin “function,” as stated by the majority, or is it part of the “way” t-PA
dissolves clots? These questions illustrate the shortcomings of the function,
way, result tests which relate to “how” a substance works, i.e., what it does,
rather than what it is, which claims purport to define. The other aspects of
Graver Tank, if properly considered by the fact-finder, would have led to a
sounder result. The substantiality of the difference between the accused and
claimed compounds, the fact of independent development, and the lack of
copying, all lead to a conclusion of lack of infringement. 28
Thus, in Judge Lourie’s view, the tripartite test for equivalence is not necessarily the best way to
address the ultimate question of whether an element in an accused product or process is
equivalent to a claim limitation, especially when the patented material is a chemical, such as a
protein or DNA molecule. He suggested that “substantiality of the difference” would be a better
test, and indeed it would not be too long before the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the
tripartite test is not the sole test for doctrine of equivalents analysis, and that substantiality of the
difference is oftentimes the more appropriate test. 29

27

29 F.3d at 1570
Id.
29
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(en banc); See also, Boehringer
Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(“Under the doctrine of
equivalents, a claim limitation not literally met may be satisfied by an element of the accused product if the
differences between the two are ‘insubstantial’ to one of ordinary skill in the art. While no particular linguistic
framework controls the inquiry, the insubstantial differences inquiry may be guided by determining whether the
28
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2. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc.
After Genentech v. Wellcome the Federal Circuit did not address the merits of a claim of
equivalence under the DOE with respect to a biomolecule claim limitation again until 2008, in
the case of Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., wherein the court affirmed a
district court’s decision that a thermophilic Thermus aquaticus (Taq) DNA polymerase gene was
not equivalent to a claim limitation requiring a gene derived from E. Coli. 30 The claim at issue
recited a “recombinant plasmid containing a DNA coding sequence for the expression of DNA
polymerase activity [derived from E. coli].” 31 The accused product was engineered to contain a
DNA polymerase gene derived from the Taq bacterium, produced using a recombinant plasmid
containing the Taq polymerase gene. The district court found no infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents.
On appeal, the patent owner argued that substitution of the Taq gene for the E. coli gene was an
insubstantial and unimportant change that resulted in an infringing equivalent. The Federal
Circuit, however, agreed with the District Court, holding that the “all limitations rule” restricts
the doctrine of equivalents by preventing its application when doing so would vitiate a claim
limitation, and that in determining whether a finding of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents would vitiate a claim limitation, one must consider “the totality of the circumstances
of each case and determine whether the alleged equivalent can be fairly characterized as an
insubstantial change from the claimed subject matter without rendering the pertinent limitation
meaningless.”
The court went on to find that a finding that Taq is an equivalent of E. coli would essentially
render the “bacterial source [is] E. coli ” claim limitation meaningless, thereby vitiating it. The
court observed that “in drafting the claims, the patentees specifically chose to limit [the claim] to
a recombinant plasmid where the bacterial source is E. coli. Appellants cannot now argue that
any bacterial source, including Taq, would infringe that claim. Accordingly, summary judgment
of noninfringement was appropriate.” 32

D. A Decision Reversing a District Court’s Finding of No Infringement on the Merits
My search identified one decision, Goldenberg v. Cytogen, in which the district court, on a
motion for summary judgment, found noninfringement under the DOE on the merits, but the
Federal Circuit reversed that decision. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was
based on its unfounded belief that the asserted equivalent was a cell surface antigen, which could
not, in that court’s view, perform the same “function” in the same “way” as “an antigen located
within a tumor cell.” 33 On appeal, the Federal Circuit faulted the district court’s conclusion for
element in the accused device ‘performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result’ as the claim limitation.”)(citing Graver Tank).
30
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
31
US Patent 6,017,745, claim 4.
32
541 F.3d at 1139.
33
Goldenberg v. Cytogen, 373 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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being based on a faulty premise, i.e., that the asserted equivalent was a cell surface antigen, when
in fact it was a transmembrane antigen. In the view of the Federal Circuit, the district court had
erred by engaging in “black and white categorization,” in assuming that an antigen must be either
intracellular or located on the cell surface, when in fact there are transmembrane antigens that
fall into a “grey” category. The court found that the question of whether a transmembrane
engine can be equivalent to an antigen located within tumor cell was a factual issue that cannot
be decided on summary judgment.

E. Ajinomoto Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n
The most recent Federal Circuit decision meeting the criteria, Ajinomoto Co. v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, was decided in August of 2019. In this case the Federal Circuit for the first time found
infringement under the DOE in a case where the claim limitation recites a biomolecule, more
specifically a DNA sequence encoding a protein. 34 This was a split decision, with a dissent
arguing that a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was barred by
prosecution history estoppel.
The patent at issue provides an improved fermentation process for producing an aromatic Lamino acid, such as L-tryptophan, which involves the use of a recombinant E. coli bacterium
that has been engineered to express higher than natural levels of YddG, a membrane protein that
transports aromatic L-amino acids out of the bacterial cell and into the surrounding culture
medium. The patent discloses and claims several means for achieving enhanced YddG activity,
but in this article I will focus on the means which was relevant for the issue of DOE, which is
through the introduction of multiple copies of a DNA sequence encoding the YddG protein into
the chromosome of a bacterium to express greater amounts of YddG than would be expressed
naturally. The claim at issue defines the DNA sequence encoding the YddG protein as either (1)
DNA encoding a protein having the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO: 2 (i.e., the amino acid
sequence of native E. coli YddG), or (2) a nucleotide sequence which hybridizes under stringent
conditions with the complement of the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO: 1 (i.e., the nucleotide
sequence of the native E. coli yddG gene).
The DOE issue in the case centered around two strains of genetically engineered E. coli that
were accused of infringing the patent claim, which the court referred to as the “first later strain”
and a “second later strain.” The chromosome of each of these strains had been engineered to
contain, in addition to the native E. coli yddG gene, a second gene encoding a YddG protein
from a non-E. coli bacterium. This non-E. coli YddG performs the same function as its E. coli
counterpart, but has a slightly different amino acid sequence. In the “first later strain,” the
second gene is the native gene derived from the non-E. coli bacterium that naturally expresses
the non-E. coli YddG protein. In the “second later strain,” the second gene is a codonrandomized version of the non-E. coli Yddg gene used in the “first later strain.” The second
34

Ajinomoto Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 932 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019). An edited copy of this decision is
provided in the “Case in Point” section accompanying this article in Biotechnology Law Report.
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gene encodes the exact same amino acid sequence in both strains, but the DNA sequence used in
the second strain has been altered by the introduction of silent mutations, substituting degenerate
codons for those that appear naturally in the non-E. coli gene.
In order to understand the prosecution history estoppel issues raised in the case, some
background on the prosecution of the patent is in order. As originally filed, the claim defined the
DNA encoding the YddG protein as either (1) DNA encoding a protein that consists of the amino
acid sequence of SEQ ID NO: 2 (i.e., the amino acid sequence of natural E. coli YddG), or (2) “a
protein which comprises an amino acid sequence including deletion, substitution, insertion or
addition of one or several amino acids in the amino acid sequence shown in SEQ ID NO:2.”
Whoever drafted the claims was obviously concerned that a claim limited to the exact amino acid
sequence of natural E. coli YddG could be circumvented by use of a protein having a slightly
different amino acid sequence but retaining substantially the same function, and sought to
broaden the definition of the protein to encompass “one or several” amino acid alterations
relative to the native gene.
During prosecution, the patent examiner rejected the claim as anticipated by a reference that
disclosed a recombinant E. coli bacteria comprising a DNA sequence encoding the E. coli “yfiK
gene product” (i.e., the E. coli YfiK protein), which presumably has an amino acid sequence
similar but not identical to the YddG protein. The use of the term “several” in the claim
limitation creates the potential for some ambiguity as to the number of amino acid variations that
would fall within the literal scope of the claim, but the specification provides:
Although the number of “several” amino acids differs depending on the
position or the type of amino acid residues in the three-dimensional
structure of the protein, it may be 2 to 30, preferably 2 to 15, and more
preferably 2 to 5 for the protein.
Giving the claim its broadest reasonable interpretation, which is the appropriate standard during
the examination of pending patent claims, the examiner should have found that the claim literally
encompasses variance of up to 30 amino acids from the sequence of native E. coli YddG protein,
which would presumably encompass the prior art YfiK protein. The applicant could have
responded by amending the claim so as to reduce the number of amino acid variations
encompassed by the claim, in a manner that would exclude the YfiK protein from the scope of
the claim. Instead, the applicant abandoned this approach to achieving claim breadth altogether,
and switched over to an approach that focuses on sequence similarity in the DNA sequence
rather than the amino acid sequence of the encoded protein. In particular, the applicant amended
the claim by replacing part (b) of the definition with “a protein which comprises an amino acid
sequence that is encoded by a nucleotide sequence that hybridizes with the nucleotide sequence
of SEQ ID NO:1 (i.e., the E. coli YddG gene) under stringent conditions.” The claim was thus
amended to encompass genes capable of hybridizing to the E. coli YddG under conditions that
are “stringent,” as that term is defined in the specification. DNA sequences will only hybridize
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to each other under stringent conditions if they share a relatively high degree of sequence
similarity, so the ability to hybridize basically serves as a proxy for DNA sequence similarity.
Particularly in the early days of biotechnology patenting, this sort of hybridization language was
routinely used in an attempt to expand the literal coverage of claims directed towards genes and
other DNA molecules, in an attempt to encompass variants differing from the literally disclosed
sequence, but sharing some degree of sequence similarity.
In proceedings before the International Trade Commission (ITC), the Commission found the
“first later strain” to be literally infringing, based on its determination that the non-E. coli yddG
gene satisfied part (2) of the definition of a DNA encoding the YddG protein, i.e., the nucleotide
sequence of the non-E. coli gene would hybridizes under stringent conditions to the E. coli yddG
gene. This finding of literal infringement was not subject of the appeal and was not directly
discussed by the Federal Circuit, but was relevant to the DOE analysis discussed below.
The “second later strain,” on the other hand, was not found by the Commission to literally
infringe, presumably because the codon-randomized non-E. coli gene was sufficiently different
in sequence that it would not hybridizes under “stringent conditions” to the E. coli gene. The
Commission went on to find, however, that the “second later strain” infringed under the DOE,
based on its determination that the codon-randomized non-E. coli gene introduced into the
genome of the second later strain is equivalent under the DOE to the nucleotide sequence defined
by part (1) of the definition of a DNA encoding the YddG protein. In other words, the amino
acid sequence encoded by the codon-randomized gene was found to be equivalent to the amino
acid sequence of natural E. coli YddG.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit began by considering whether the doctrine of PHE barred a
finding of infringement under the DOE. The Federal Circuit panel was divided on this issue,
with the majority holding that PHE did not apply in this case, while the dissent argued that it did.
The views of both the majority and dissent are summarized below.
Applying Festo, the majority found that, although the narrowing amendment had created a
presumption of PHE, the presumption had been rebutted under the “tangential relation”
exception. In particular, the court found that the “objectively evident rationale for the
amendment was to limit the set of proteins within the claim’s scope so that it no longer included
the prior-art E. coli YfiK protein and, more generally, no longer allowed as wide a range of
amino acid alterations (hence changes in the protein) as original alternative (B), which had
allowed “deletion, substitution, insertion or addition of one or several amino acids in the amino
acid sequence shown in SEQ ID NO: 2.” The reason for the amendment had nothing to do with
choosing among several DNA sequences in the redundant genetic code that correspond to the
same protein.”
The majority pointed out that the native non-E. coli gene used in the “first later strain” fell within
the literal scope of the claim, presumably due to the similarity of the E. coli and non-E. coli gene
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sequences, which would result in hybridization under stringent conditions, and that the native
non-E. coli gene of the “first later strain” encoded a protein having an identical amino acid
sequence to the codon-randomized non-E. coli gene present in the “second later strain.” Since
the proteins encoded by the two genes were identical, the only difference was in codon usage,
and the majority concluded that the reason for the amendment had nothing to do with narrowing
the claim with respect to codon usage.
Moving to the merit of the DOE claim, the majority concluded that substantial evidence
supported the Commission’s finding of equivalence under the function-way-result framework.
This evidence included the following.
With respect to “function,” Ajinomoto’s expert testified that both E. coli and non-E. coli YddG
proteins function as export proteins that actively export aromatic L-amino acids out of the
bacterial cell. A 2007 article similarly explains that both proteins are involved in exporting
aromatic compounds. And an employee of the accused infringer testified during a deposition that
both proteins would be expected to have similar functions based on similarities in the organisms
from which they are derived.
As to “way,” substantial evidence supported a finding that the two proteins perform the
membrane-transport function in substantially the same way, based on the structural similarity of
the two proteins, i.e., 85% to 95% identity in structure.
Finally, as to “result,” Ajinomoto’s expert testified that, by exporting L-tryptophan out of the
bacterial cell, both proteins increase the ability of bacteria to produce and accumulate Ltryptophan. That statement was supported by accused infringer’s own fermentation data, which
showed that strains containing the E. coli yddG gene but with a stronger promoter, and strains
containing the non-E. coli yddG gene with a strong promoter, both showed greater production of
L-tryptophan than did strains containing the E. coli yddG gene with the native promoter. In other
words, enhancing the expression of either the E. coli or the non-E. coli yddG gene had the effect
of increasing production of L-tryptophan, which supports an inference that the proteins encoded
by those genes both result in increased L-tryptophan production.
The accused infringer argued that the two proteins do not perform the same function in the same
way because the E. coli YddG protein exports aromatic L-amino acids such as L-tryptophan,
whereas the non-E. coli YddG protein exports a different compound—namely, paraquat (also
known as methyl viologen). But a 2012 article on the record explained that YddG proteins can
export both types of compounds, and the court held that the “fact that the non-E. coli YddG
protein may be involved in exporting compounds other than L-tryptophan in the non-E. coli
organism does not undermine the Commission’s well-supported finding that the non-E. coli
YddG protein is involved in exporting L-tryptophan in the E. coli bacteria used by [the accused
infringer].”
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Writing in dissent, Judge Dyk expressed his view that Ajinomoto had not rebutted the
presumption of PHE under the tangential relation exception, noting that the Federal Circuit has
consistently described this exception as “very narrow.” He points out that after the examiner
rejected the claim based on prior art disclosing an E. coli protein having an amino acid sequence
similar to, but not identical with E. coli YddG, the applicant could have continued to define the
scope of the claim in terms of amino acid sequence variations from the E. coli protein, and
narrowed the range of permitted variation to exclude the prior art. Instead, however, the
applicant deliberately elected to redefine the claimed proteins in terms of the ability of their
encoding nucleotide sequences to hybridize with the E. coli yddG sequence as set forth in SEQ
ID NO: 1. The amended claim language excluded the prior art because the YfiK encoding DNA
sequence disclosed by that prior art did not meet the newly added hybridization requirement. In
other words, the anticipating prior art disclosed E. coli YfiK protein, encoded by the yfiK gene,
and this prior art was avoided by narrowing the claim to only cover proteins encoded by certain
highly similar nucleotide sequences.
Like the prior art asserted during prosecution, the “second later strain” is not literally covered by
the amended claims because it is employs a YddG encoding nucleotide sequence that does not
hybridize with SEQ ID NO: 1 under stringent conditions. The rationale for the narrowing
amendment (avoiding a prior art DNA sequence that does not meet the newly claimed
hybridization requirement) directly relates to the accused equivalent (a protein made by an
encoding nucleotide sequence that does not meet the hybridization requirement). Judge Dyk
would find that the tangential exception cannot apply, because in his view the asserted equivalent
is directly related to the reason for the amendment, i.e., to exclude proteins made by an encoding
nucleotide sequence that does not hybridize with SEQ ID NO: 1 under stringent conditions.

IV.

Some Concluding Thoughts

There was a time when patent practitioners and academic commentators believed that the DOE
would play a critical role in supplementing the literal scope of patent claims reciting
biomolecules. The Festo decisions raised concerns that amendments made during prosecution
might one day trigger PHE, and sparked a great deal of discussion amongst patent prosecutors as
to claiming and amendment strategies intended to preserve the right of the patentee to
successfully assert infringement under the DOE. In retrospect, however, the DOE has come into
play relatively infrequently with regard to biomolecule claim limitations, at least as reflected in
the decisions of the Federal Circuit. It took until 2019 for the Federal Circuit to issue a decision
in which the DOE was successfully asserted in this context, and even then the dissenting judge in
Ajinomoto would have found the DOE barred by PHE.
Personally, I do not think it was surprising that the majority found infringement under the DOE
based on the merits in Ajinomoto. The Commission’s conclusion that the non-E. coli YddG
protein performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the
same result as the E. coli YddG protein seems well supported by the evidence. Ajinomoto is
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clearly distinguishable over Genentech v. Wellcome, in which the accused FE1X protein had a
substantially different amino acid sequence and functionality than the human t-PA recited in the
claim.
PHE was the more interesting issue in Ajinomoto, and this is where the dissent parted from the
panel majority. The majority’s holding that the tangential relation exception applied does strike
me as inconsistent with the Federal Circuit 2006 decision in Amgen v. Hoechst (discussed
above). The dissent argues persuasively, in light of precedent, that the tangential relation
exception should not have been applied, given that the original claim had sought to literally
encompass a certain range of amino acid substitutions in the E. coli YddG protein, the claim had
been rejected over prior art disclosing an amino acid sequence falling within this range, and the
claim had been narrowed to avoid this prior art. The reason for the amendment does not appear
to have been tangential to the difference between the recited limitation and the accused product,
i.e., variation in the amino acid sequence.
On the other hand, I think that the foreseeability exception could have been found applicable in a
case such as this. The Federal Circuit never discusses the foreseeability exception in Ajinomoto,
presumably because the Commission did not rely on it in its decision. However, given the
complexity of the relationship between structure and function in amino acid sequences, and the
constraints imposed by the enablement and written description requirements on the ability of
patent needs to claim a broadly defined genus of biomolecules, I think a good case could be
made that, as a practical matter, it is too much to expect the claim drafter to foresee and literally
cover any and all amino acid variations that perform substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to achieve the same result. With respect to biomolecule claim
limitations in general, it will often be the case that it is unreasonable to expect a patent
prosecutor to draft a claim literally encompassing all equivalents, which is the fundamental
standard set forth in Festo II for overcoming a presumption of PHE. 35
In retrospect, it is clear that the applicant for the Ajinomoto patent did not need to introduce any
literal language into the claim expanding the scope of the biomolecule limitation. The finding of
infringement under the DOE was based on equivalence between the amino acid sequence of the
accused non-E. coli YddG and the amino acid sequence of E. coli YddG protein; the claim
language reciting polynucleotides capable of hybridizing under stringent conditions was
superfluous. The patentee could have achieved the same result by simply reciting the amino acid
sequence of the E. coli YddG protein, and not worrying about literally encompassing variants.
In fact, it seems to me that the only thing that saved the patentee in Ajinomoto was that during
prosecution, when faced with the prior art rejection, the applicant chose to abandon its initial
attempt to achieve scope by claiming variations in the amino acid sequence, and switched over to
35

535 U.S. at 741 (“The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.”)
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a limitation reciting polynucleotides capable of hybridizing under stringent conditions to the
DNA encoding the amino acid sequence. The more straightforward approach would have been
to avoid the prior art by amending the claim in a manner to reduce the scope of variations in the
amino acid sequence, i.e., by reciting a smaller number of variations in the amino acid sequence.
But if the applicant had done that, it would have been very difficult to successfully argue that the
amendment bore only a tangential relation to the accused equivalent. On the other hand, I think
that my comments above regarding the difficulty of foreseeing functional equivalents of amino
acid sequences, and the unreasonableness of expecting a claim drafter to literally encompass
functional equivalents, would still apply. To me it would not make sense to find the patentee
estopped from asserting infringement under the DOE simply because the practitioner who
amended the claim chose to switch from amino acid variation to polynucleotide hybridization,
rather than the more logical and straightforward approach of amending to claim so as to limit the
range of amino acid variation.
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